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By ALFRED B. TETON t
SECTIO N 77B, 1 a statute enacted to remedy the substantive and pro-
cedural difficulties inherent in reorganization through equity receivership,
has in turn been supplanted by a statute 2 designed to eliminate the weak-
nesses that survived in, or stemmed from, reorganization under 7713. The
significant reforms embodied in the latter statute, Chapter Ten of the
Chandler Act, may be classified as either supervisory or socializing in
character. These categories are not self-contained and the reforms treated
under one division project their influence into the other. But in the main,
the supervisory innovations involve the erection of safeguards to protect
investors who are dependent on honest, sound reorganizations to salvage
their investments, by compelling the appointment of disinterested trustees,
by utilizing the advisory offices of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and by the chastening of reorganization committees.3 The social-
izing features of Chapter Ten aim to achieve the same object by increas-
ing the opportunities for investor articulation, investor information and
investor participation, by revising the compensation provisions and by
injecting considerations of "public policy" into the reorganization picture.
I. THE SUPERVISORY REFORMS
Many of the evils of friendly receiverships were carried into 77B
reorganizations by way of debtors in possession or friendly trustees.4
Control of the distressed corporation permitted the old management not
only to insulate itself from potential prosecution for its previous prac-
tices but to maintain a position of prestige and power, from which it
could influence security holders to support its plan and projects. Thus
were made possible the intrenchment of officers, efficient or inefficient,
the suppression of investigations into the conduct of the old manage-
ment, honest or dishonest, and the foisting of unfair plans upon masses
of innocent investors, helplessly unorganized, or hopelessly uninformed.
These evils, exhaustively reported by the Securities and Exchange Com-
tSterling Fellow, Yale Law School; fember of Illinois Bar.
1. § 77B, 48 STAT. 911, 11 U. S. C. § 207 (1934).
2. Chandler Act, Chapter X, 52 STAT. &3, 11 U. S.C. § 501 (1938). In 1937,
Congress passed a "Chapter X" for municipal debt adjustments. This part of the bank-
ruptcy act has become Chapter IX of the Chandler Act.
3. See letter from Dean James I. Landis, then Chairman of the Securities &
Exchange Commission, printed in Hearings before t11 Committec on the Judiciary on
H. R. 6439 (reintroduced and passed as H. R. 8046), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 423-
426. Hereinafter, this source will be referred to as House Hearings.
4. Clark, Corporate Reorgani.ations Under the Bansiruptcy Act (1937) 12 J. N. A.
REF. BANXE. 38; Comment (1937) 47 YL.E L. J. 229, 237.
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mission,' so impinged themselves upon the consciousness of those familiar
with the mechanics of reorganization that, with a few exceptions,' the
Bar either favored or did not violently oppose the reforms recommended
by the S.E.C.7
The mandatory appointment of a disinterested trustee in all cases
involving liabilities of $250,000 or more s is generally regarded as the
keystone of the reform program.' Provision for the compulsory appoint-
ment of a trustee would in itself have been sufficient to shock the friends
of management; the additional requirement that the trustee must be
disinterested,"0 free of connections not only with the old management
but with all its associates, provoked charges of novelty and radicalism11
But efforts to secure independent and faithful administration of distressed
properties are neither novel nor radical.12 This fact does not of course
establish the desirability of the change, and any analysis must review
the cavalcade of contentions that have been, or may be, raised against
the mandatory appointment of trustees. Most frequently adduced is the
argument that in numerous cases there is no reason to suspect that there
has been mismanagement or misconduct, the appointment therefore being
unnecessary in the interest of either efficient or honest management.1"
Obviously, however, some investigation is necessary before it can be
5. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE ComminussIoN, REPORT ON PROTECTIVE & REORGAN-
IZATIoN ComimirrEs (1936-1937), in seven parts. An eighth part is soon to be published.
6. See Swaine, "Deinocratication" of Corporate Reorganiadtion (1938) 38 CoL, L.
REv. 256. Critics of Chapter X generally recognized the existence of reorganization evils
-but, as in the past, hoped for purification by incantation rather than by legislation.
7. Referee Friebolin, Bankruptcy Marches On (1937) 42 Commr. L. Joun. 411;
Referee Kurtz, Corporate Reorganization Problems (1935) 10 J. N. A. REF. BANCt. 10;
Referee Adams, in letter printed in House Hearings 358; District Judge Patterson, in
letter read by S.E.C. Chairman Douglas, House Hearings 175; cf. statement of judges'
opposition to mandatory appointment of trustees, House Hearings 343.
8. Chapter X, § 156. The trustee's attorney must also be disinterested except that
for purposes other than representation of the trustee in the Chapter X proceedings, the
trustee may, with court approval, retain a non-disinterested attorney. § 157.
9. See Douglas, House Hearings 164, 177; Comment (1938) 24 VA. L. Ruv. 309.
10. § 158 defines non-disinterestedness. Subsection (4) of § 158 declares that a
person is not disinterested if, for any reason, it appears he has an interest materially
adverse to any creditors or stockholders. Will one who has a proprietary interest in
a competing corporation be so classified? Will an attorney in the same office with an
"interested" person be so disqualified? See In re Gosden, C. C. H. Banlr. Serv. t 51343
(E. D. N. Y. 1938) (held not disqualified).
11. See Swaine, supra note 6; statements of representatives of bar associations in
Hearings before Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on -I. R. 8o,16, 75th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1937-1938) 28, 83, 202. Hereinafter, reference will be made to the
latter source as Senate Hearings.
12. See Taft, Recent Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, (1895) 18 A. B. A. REp.
237, 263. See also § 77(c) (1), 49 STAT. 914, 11 U. S. C. § 205(c) (1) (1934).
13. See statement of Brownback, Senate Hearings 83 et seq.; Laporte, Changes in
Corporate Reorganization Procedure Proposed by the Chandler and Lea Bills (1933)
51 HARv. L. REV. 672, 678.
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safely concluded that no investigation is necessary, and a hornbook rule
is unavailable to control the selection of cases which require a change in
management. To delegate to individual security holders the onus of
apprising the court when an investigation is required is to ignore the
dismal result of such delegation in equity receiverships and 7713 reor-
ganizations. 4 The possible displacement of some capable, honest man-
agement1" cannot discourage the erection of safeguards for the pro-
tection of investors in numerous other cases where an independent trustee,
free from self interest and ulterior motives, is indispensable if investors
are to be adequately represented.' 0
Another objection, often implied and sometimes expressed, is that the
restrictions of Chapter Ten will require trustees to be recruited from
among the ignorant or the unemployed.'" Over and above its hyperbolic
effect, the objection has practical overtones in suggesting the possible
difficulties of obtaining suitable persons, wholly without business con-
nections with the old management, the debtor or the underwriter, to act
as trustee, and to operate the debtor.' 8 The difficulties suggested are not
likely to prove insuperable. There are two types of management that
the trustee may displace titidari,, and the word "titularly" is advisedly
emphasized because Section 191 permits the trustee to employ officers of
the debtor and enables him to capitalize on their knowledge and experience.
These managements may be either honest or dishonest. In all probability
honest managements will actively cooperate with the trustee even during
an investigation, not only because they have nothing to hide or fear but
because by doing effective work with the trustee they may convince the
court that they should be restored to their titular positions 0 or, in any
event, that they should be returned in their old capacities to the reorgan-
ized corporations." On the other hand, if the management is dishonest
and attempts to sabotage the investigation or completely refuses to co-
14. See Report of Counsel to Special Committee of the Senate Investigating Recefer-
ship and Bankruptcy Proceedings and Administration of Justicc in U. S. Courts, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess., Doc. # 268, 24, 27-28, 30 (1936). A recent case illustrating the diffi-
culties encountered by individual shareholders seeking investigations is Bache v. Louisiana
Oil Refining Corp. 97 F. (2d) 445, 447 (C. C. A. 5th, 193); cf. Gruenwald v. Mfoir
Hotel Co., 96 F. (2d) 932 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938). On the necessity of a minimum of
investigation see Riger, House Hearings 381; Frank, Senate Hearings 93.
15. This possibility seems rather remote because the new trustee may retain members
of the old management to assist him. § 191.
16. See testimony of S.E.C. Chairman Douglas, House Hearings 164-176.
17. See statement of Heuston, Senate Hearings 30; Brownback, Senate Hearings 33.
18. § 158.
19. § 156 makes it possible for the court to appoint one who is not disinterested
within the meaning of § 158 as co-trustee with a disinterested person.
20. The court, before confirming a plan, must be satisfied that the appointment of
directors, officers or voting trustees of the reorganized corporation is consistent with
public policy and the interests of security holders. § 221(5). Infra, p. 607.
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operate in running the business, it is precisely the type of management
which, everyone concedes, should be displaced. Opponents of the man-
datory trustee provisions have suggested that if a disinterested trustee
is appointed, an officer or director of the debtor should be appointed as
co-trustee in order that the continuity of the business venture should not
be impaired."' Although the appointment of two trustees is preferable
to none, courts should be slow to dignify a member of the old manage-
ment with the trustee's title. The influence and blandishments of an
additional trustee are bound to be much stronger and more effective than
could be exerted by the same person occupying a managerial position.
Until there is proof that the management has been honest and capable,
there is danger that the ostensible desire to preserve the facade of func-
tional continuity may be but another way of phrasing the desire to main-
tain the emoluments of management.22
Of course, disinterestedness will not be the sole test of a trustee's
qualifications. Even though the trustee should not be expected to be
intimately familiar with the financial problems of a given corporation,
he should have knowledge of the problems generally arising in corporate
reorganization and he should be sufficiently familiar with the type of
business involved to enable him intelligently to formulate a plan and to
appraise the prospects and condition of the debtor, evaluate the caliber
of the old management and determine whether an investigation is neces-
sary. The character and ability of the trustee are so important that his
selection should not leave the court with a Hobson's choice of relying
upon nominations of the debtor, which would carry a distinct threat to
the independence of the trustee, or of making unadvised selections, which
would involve the judge either in independent investigations or patronage
dispensation.2" Judges in a given district might therefore do well to
create their own panel of qualified persons from which trustees would
be selected. Applications for appointments as trustees could be submitted
to the appropriate district, which should then delegate some administra-
tive agency, perhaps the regional office of the S.E.C., to investigate the
character, efficiency and business experience of the applicant. Once such
a panel was established, judges could make their selections without undue
fear that they were choosing blindly.24
21. See Swaine, supra note 6, at 279; Gerdes, Corporate ReorganizaIions (1937)
71 U. S. L. REv. 443, 453.
22. In the first part of its Report, the S. E. C. has discussed the patronage available
to management in reorganizing the old corporation and launching the new. In any event,
the alleged advantages of keeping management in control are not self-evident. See In re
Barclay Park Corp., 90 F. (2d) 595, 598 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
23. See Senate Hearings 57; Rodgers & Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corpor-
ations "under §77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 COL. L. RIv. 571, 605; Lowenthal,
The Railroad Reorganivation Act (1933) 47 HoAv. L. Rzv. 18, 32.
24. The panel system of qualified trustees is being used in Canada. The Canadian
Act provides for the appointment of a Superintendent of Bankruptcy to supervise the
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If Chapter Ten is to be criticized for its provisions concerning trustees,
it could more justifiably be criticized for failing to make mandatory the
appointment of trustees in all cases. According to figures compiled by
Dun & Bradstreet,25 3583 applications for reorganization under Section
77B were filed between June 7, 1934 and September 22, 1938. Available
breakdowns for 2741 of these cases reveal that 2139, or fully 747,
involved liabilities up to $250,000. Even if it were assumed that the
remaining cases, all but 38 of which are other than commercial or in-
dustrial failures, involved liabilities of $250,000, the percentage of cases
in which appointment of trustees would remain unobligatory would be
just short of 60%. It is in this large class of optional cases that evils,
more frequently than in the larger cases, are said to be concomitants
of debtor control. While counsel representing large interests were altru-
istically asserting that appointments of trustees in small cases would be
particularly unfortunate,2" credit associations were selfishly insisting that
the appointment of trustees in small cases was especially necessary.2
Counsel for credit associations testified at Senate hearings that assets are
often frittered away or dissipated in the small cases before either creditors
or courts realize what is happening, and that the scheme of debtor-
possession permits old officers and employees of the debtor to perpetuate
their jobs and keep on losing money without any restraining check.23
Under Chapter Ten, the possibility of appointing an independent trustee
in all cases does exist but that practice is unlikely to develop in view both
administration of insolvent estates and to investigate the character and other qualifica-
tions of applicants for licensed trusteeships. REv. STAT. C z;. c. 11, § 36A (1927);
DuNcAN AND RmLLY, BANKRu TcY iN CANADA (Zd ed. 1933) 307. The system was
tried, but abandoned under §77. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U.S.C. §205(c) (1934).
The Congressional hearings on proposed modifications of the railroad reorganization
section in 1934 did little to advance a reason for the abandonment. The chief objection
to the panel seems to have been the reluctance of the courts to choose trustees from
a panel the names for which were selected by the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Hearings before the Com ndttee on Judiciary on H. R. 6249, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 52
(1935). This objection to panels under Chapter X would be obviated by having the
trustees nominated, or even, selected by the judges themselves.
25. Communication to author from Dun & Bradstreet, October 28, 1933. Monthly
summaries of applications under 77B, without details, can be found in issues of DUN's
REvIrEW AND Dui's STATISTICAL SUPPLE rENT. For a breakdowm of 77B applications
on the basis of capitalizations, see Davis, How Has 77B Actually Worked? (August,
1937) 45 DuN's RE:v. 18.
26. See Swaine, supra note 6, at 264; statement of E. S. S. Sunderland, member of
Am. Bar Ass'n Bankruptcy Committee, House Hearings 281.
27. Statement of W. R. Montgomery, general counsel of the National Association
of Credit Men, Senate Hearings 73; statement of R. G. Hunt, representing the Los
Angeles Wholesale Board of Trade and the Board of Trade of San Francisco, Scate
Hearings 47.
28. Senate Hearings 48, 74.
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of judicial hesitance to do what Congress definitely refused to do.0 and
of a not unwarranted reluctance to incur the expense of trustee appoint-
ment in the smaller cases. In order to safeguard small estates from the
ravages of negligent or dishonest management, the old officers should
not be left in unqualified, unguarded possession as under 77B. A solution
looking to the retention of the old management with appropriate pre-
cautions to insure financial responsibility for mismanagement during the
reorganization period would require the old management to be placed
under bond conditioned on the faithful performance of its duties. In-
vestors would thus receive some assurance that continuity of manage-
ment would not operate to their ultimate disadvantage. There should be
no difficulty in obtaining such bonds since, under Section 188, a debtor
in possession has all the rights and duties of a trustee appointed under
Section 156 and, like a trustee, is subject to the control of the court. If
a debtor, appointed trustee, could secure a bond, no reason exists why
the same type of bond could not be obtained for the debtor without the
formality of appointment as trustee.3 If in fact the impossibility of
obtaining bonds for "debtors" in possession does appear, Chapter Ten
should be amended to permit the appointment of debtors as trustees in
non-mandatory cases.
An aspect of trustees' appointment which has met with criticism from
friendly sources is that which authorizes the court to appoint a trustee
without creditor advice.3 1 Section 77B required both notice to the debtor,
and such others as the court might determine, and a hearing before
appointment.3 2 Chapter Ten, however, requires that a meeting be held
not before the appointment but within thirty to sixty days after the
approval of the reorganization petition to advise the court whether to
continue the debtor in possession or to retain the already-appointed
trustee, as the case may be.33 If these critics have correctly construed
Section 156 to require the mandatory appointment to be made coinci-
dentally with the approval of the petition, in cases of voluntary petitions
immediately approved, the court would seem to have no alternative
but to make the appointment at once, without hearing creditors. But in
cases involving less than $250,000 the court could proceed in a less
precipitate manner. Immediate appointment may be undesirable because
an unqualified person may be designated. Creditor objections, which
might have been effective to prevent an appointment, lose their effective-
ness with lapse of time. The longer a trustee is permitted to operate,
29. One of the first bills provided that appointment of trustees was to be mandatory
in all cases. See H. R. 6439, c. IV, § 12, II, d(1) (1937).
30. Cf. Senate Hearings 52 (surety companies would not write such bonds).
31. Friebolin (1937) 42 Coirld. L. J. 411; Hunt, Senate Hearhngs 50.
32. 11 U.S.C. §207(c) (1) (1934).
33. §§ 161, 162.
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the more secure becomes his position. At the same time, prompt appoint-
ment of trustees may have the virtue of depriving the debtor of oppor-
tunities to practice concealment or manipulate accounts. An elastic rule,
recognizing a distinction between voluntary and involuntary petitions,
might therefore be drawn. WAhere involuntary petitions are filed, appoint-
ments can be made immediately upon approval of the petition, without
loss of creditor cooperation, because the petitioning creditors, as well as
the debtor and the S.E.C., will know of the filing of the petition and will
have opportunities to appear before the court. Where voluntary peti-
tions are filed, 4 and the debtor satisfies the court that it complies with
the requirements of the chapter, it will be unlikely and unnecessary that
a trustee would be appointed immediately; unlikely, because having ap-
proved the petition without waiting for creditors, stockholders or inden-
ture trustees to controvert the allegations of the petition, the court is
likely to have faith in the debtor; unnecessary, because the dangers of
concealment and manipulation, having existed before the petition was
voluntarily filed, are not likely to become aggravated. Hence, in cases
involving a voluntary petition and an indebtedness of less than $250,000,
appointment of trustees should be postponed until the hearing described
in Section 161 is held and creditors are assembled.
Possibly the appointment of trustees may be postponed in all cases.
Section 156 calls for the appointment of a mandatory trustee upon "the
approval of the petition." But "upon" approval may simply mean "some-
time after," as its use in other portions of the Act suggests.' And if
"upon approval" in Section 156 is taken to be indicative of futurity rather
than immediateness, the court may withhold selection of a trustee even
in the compulsory cases until after the hearing contemplated in Section
161. Under this construction of Section 156 the selection of a trustee
could be made with the cooperation and advice of all parties in interest.:"
34. Of § 77B proceedings instituted during 1936, about 90% involved voluntary
petitions. House Hearings 421.
35. Section 141 provides that "Upon the filing of a petition by the debtor, the judge
shall enter an order approving the petition, if satisfied" that the petition "has been filed in
good faith." The practice of immediately entering orders approving voluntary petitions
is not likely to develop, particularly in view of § 144 which contemplates that if an
answer is filed to the debtor's petition, the court will not approve the petition until it
has passed upon the allegations in the answer. See also § 163. But cf. § 164. If the
necessity for immediate replacement of the management in possession seems pressing,
the appointment of a trustee may be postponed and the debtor ousted by utilizing the
new provisions of Chapter X, which permit the appointment of receivers in reorganiza-
tions. § 117.
36. This construction of § 156 may be opposed to the intention of the draftsmen of
the act When, in H. R. 6439, the appointment of all trustees was to be mandatory
[supra note 29], the "upon approval" phrase was also used. At the same time, the
section corresponding to what is now § 161 [p. 55 H. R. 6439 (1937)] provided that at
the hearing, the court was to hear objections relating to the retention of the trustee in
1939]
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If a panel plan of trustee selection be adopted, the hearing would still
be useful in fixing upon a choice from those qualified on the panel list.
Duties of the Trustee: Investigation
The doubt and ambiguity that distinguish the appointment of a trustee
are not likely to characterize the nature of the trustee's duties. By and
large, the trustee has two functions other than administering the business
affairs of the debtor: the investigation of the debtor's affairs and the
management's conduct, and the formulation of a plan of reorganization.
One of the sinister features of management control of property in
reorganization was the management's ability to forestall any investigation
into its past record to determine whether or not any claims existed against
the old officers or their associates, and to ascertain generally the manage-
ment's fitness to be retained in office. The Commission sought to ensure
an independent administration of the debtor's property based upon
full knowledge of all facts surrounding the old stewardship by requiring
in every case an investigation, the duration of which would be determined
by the nature and circumstances of the case.17 The fear that investiga-
tions in all cases would often result in fruitless expense, and the bogey
of persecuting honest management by inquisitorial investigations 8 resulted
in modification of the mandatory provisions and substitution therefor
of provisions leaving it within the discretion of the judge whether to
order an investigation. 9 In such cases as inevitably involve or optionally
reshlt in appointment of trustees, the modification will not operate to
any serious prejudice, since the trustee is required, as soon as practical,
to prepare a report of his investigations of property, liabilities and finan-
cial condition of the debtor." In the course of acquiring information for
this purpose, and even without contemplating an investigation, the trustee
would probably audit the books and records as well as secure the advice
of experts concerning the general routine and operation of the debtor.4"
He will be asking questions, consulting, receiving complaints or sug-
gestions from creditors, all resulting in the accumulation of information
from which he could make a sound enough judgment in most cases as
to the desirability of an investigation. '
If a trustee is not appointed, the problem of investigation looms larger.
A procedure which might prove neither too expensive nor dilatory would
involve the appointment of a disinterested auditor as examiner under
Section 168 to make a preliminary investigation of the acts and conduct
office. The debtor was not mentioned at all because it was evidently expected that the
trustee would have been appointed before the meeting was held.
37. H. R. 6439, c. IV, § 12(11), d, (5) (a) (1937) 57.
38. See House Hearings 167.
39. §167(1).
40. § 167(5) ; infra, p. 598.




of the management and the condition of the debtor.' If such a fishing
expedition, for it would be that, revealed grounds for a general investiga-
tion, the debtor could be displaced by a trustee. In order to avoid any
element of wishful investigation by a job-seeking examiner, the examiner
should not be eligible for appointment as trustee, despite his familiarity
with the debtor's affairs. This exploratory investigation should be com-
pleted by the time the meeting called for under Section 161 is held, so
that the court may have a report available when it is called upon to
determine whether or not to leave the debtor in possession. Unless some
procedure calling for at least a tentative investigation is followed, the
evils of debtor control will be unabated where trustees are not appointed.
The appointment of an examiner might not only reveal information in-
dispensable for intelligent, lasting rehabilitation but it may have an
inhibitory effect upon all management in administration of property in
their trust.43 Provisional investigations, with their accumulation of need-
ful facts and their minatory reminders to all management, are far removed
from vindictive witch-hunting 44 and visionary chasing of will-o'-the-
wisps.45
Duties of the Trustee: The Plait
The most important of the trustee's routine duties is that calling for
him to submit a plan of reorganization within the time fixed by the
judge.4" Both in equity and 77B reorganizations, self-seeking, self-
serving, self-appointed groups representing managers and bankers mon-
opolized the processes of reorganization, including the formulation of
the plan. In order to break the monopoly and to procure plans that
would not be drawn by those interested in saving themselves, the
Securities and Exchange Commission recommended that initiative in the
formulation of the plan be entrusted to an independent trustee, whose
principal objective would be a genuine reorganization leading to a sound
corporate structure.47 This recommendation is now embodied in Section
167, which authorizes the trustee to notify creditors and stockholders
that they are to submit to him plans, proposals or suggestions. But the
trustee is more than a mere collecting agency. Whether or not com-
mittees, having been deprived of unrestricted control of the emoluments
42. See Friebolin, supra note 31; It re Utilities Power & Light Corp., 90 F. (2d)
736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), a § 77B case in which the court continued the debtor in
possession but appointed an investigator.
43. See Dodd, Securities and Exchange Conmzssion s Reform Program for Banh.
ruptcy Reorganization (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 223, 229.
44. See Hunt, Progress of the Chandler Banlruptcy Bill (1937) 42 Co.m L. J.
195, 197.
45. See Swaine, supra note 6, at 264.
46. § 167.
47. Letter of Dean Landis, House Hearings 425.
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of reorganization and having been subjected to stricter supervision, play
an active role in effectuating a reorganization, the trustee will be expected
to supply the motive power and to determine the direction of the reor-
ganization proceeding. To ensure the active participation of the trustee
in the formulation of a plan, Section 169 requires the trustee to prepare
and file a plan, or report his reasons for believing that a plan cannot be
effected.
Chapter Ten does not build any framework within which the trustee
must formulate the plan. He is evidently free to adopt any procedure he
deems advisable. In all likelihood, he will adopt the procedure common
in previous reorganizations of bringing proponents and opponents of
plans together at the proverbial round-table and threshing out an ac-
ceptable plan. The present practice will differ from previous procedures,
however, in having the trustee at the table, representing those long
unrepresented, and in making the adoption of a fair, sound plan the
primary objective of the reorganization process. Whether the trustee
decides to file a plan submitted by a security holder or whether he formu-
lates his own, representing the result of compromises effected and bargains
made, the plan he files is to be regarded as his plan. If opponents of the
obligatory trustee sections have correctly assumed that almost all business
is honest4 and if it is proper to assume that almost all honest manage-
ments will cooperate with the trustee in running the business, then the
appointment of an experienced reorganization lawyer as trustee would
be far from a deplorable choice, for a trustee, skilled in the manage-
ment of men, familiar with the formulating of plans and experienced
in the give and take of round-table conferences would have high chances
of achieving a prompt, practical reorganization.
The propriety of the trustee's formulating a plan of reorganization
has been questioned on the ground that such a function will destroy the
trustee's disinterested, nonpartisan character.40 If qualified persons are
appointed trustees, they will be working impartially for the successful
rehabilitation of the debtor and the interests of all investors. Even after
submitting a particular plan, the trustee may remain disinterested in the
sense that he will be free of selfish interest and desirous of securing
approval for a plan which he deems, from an impartial standpoint, to be
fair and feasible. Whether this scheme for plans will be more successful
than the old practice is of course but a matter for speculation. One
suggestive bit of evidence appears in the records of the House Hearings
on the Chandler Bill." In a letter supporting the appointment of dis-
interested trustees, a federal referee wrote that in 77B proceedings twice
48. See Brownback, Senate Hearings 89, quoting Senator Vandenberg as authority
for proposition that 98% of business is honest.
49. House Hearings 319; Senate Hearings 43.
50. Letter of Referee Charles True Adams, House Hearings 358.
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as many plans, on a proportional basis, had been adopted in cases wherein
trustees had been appointed as in those wherein debtors had been
allowed to remain in possession, and that the plans adopted in trustees
reorganizations seemed fairer and more meritorious.
The Commission and the Court
The Securities and Exchange Commission must be considered in any
discussion of the Chandler Bill, not only because of its status under the
Act but also because of its sponsorship of the reform measures. After
Representative Chandler introduced House Bill 12,889, ' which attempted
to reform general bankruptcy procedure without eliminating fundamental
weaknesses in the reorganization sections, the Commission began its
campaign for genuine reform. One of the major points in its program
was based upon the belief that a qualified administrative agency was
indispensable in the analysis of the fairness and soundness of reorgan-
ization lans.12 The Commission's extensive excursion into the history
of reorganization proceedings had convinced it that the reorganization
was not exclusively a problem of law, that judges, trained to consider
legal questions, were being called upon to decide business and financial
problems, and that the courts were being overwhelmed by non-legal,
administrative problems. The Commission therefore recommended" that
"The facilities of a qualified administrative agency should be made avail-
able to the court as an aid in the administration of the estates and in
the analysis of the fairness, equity and soundness of plans." This ad-
ministrative assistance to the court was to be provided by two measures:
one, permitting the Commission to intervene in all cases and to be
accorded full participation in all phases of the proceedings; the other,
requiring plans of reorganization to be submitted to the Commission
for advisory report before they were submitted to creditors and stock-
holders for acceptance.
House Bill 6,439 was then introduced, incorporating these recommen-
dations. Opposition to the Commission's unlimited right to intervene was
strong, and an amendment was drafted permitting the Commission to
file an appearance, if the judge approves, but denying to it the right
of appeal.' This limitation should not seriously limit the effectiveness
of the Commission's participation, for it will still be able to perform the
function it deemed essential-intervention in cases wherein the interests
of investors are not being adequately represented.
51. On May 28, 1936.
52. Letter of Dean Landis, House Hearings 423-424.
53. S.E.C. REPoRT, Part I, 900 (1937).
54. §208. The language of the section is sufficiently neutral to make ambiguous
the Commission's status in defending appeals as wrell as in joining in appeals initiated
by others.
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In addition to being able to file its appearance in any case, the Com-
mission must, in cases involving more than $3,000,000, and may, in
cases involving less, be given an opportunity to render an advisory
opinion on whatever plan or plans the court deems worthy for its con-
sideration.5 It is quite likely, and was so anticipated, that courts would
make voluntary references in cases involving less than that amount."0
Some estimate of the proportion of cases which the court must submit
to the Commission may be made on the basis of figures prepared by the
Commission. 57 In 1936, the number of applications for reorganization
under 77B, for which information was available, totalled 914. Of these,
65 or less than 8%, involved liabilities of $2,000,000 or more. Records
of Dun & Bradstreet, 8 limited to industrial and commercial reorganiza-
tions, reveal that of 2741 applications filed during the life of Section
77B, only 106 or about 4%, involved liabilities of more than $3,000,000.
The Dun & Bradstreet figures are admittedly too low because they do
not take into consideration non-commercial and non-industrial applica-
tions, totalling 804, in which the liabilities are usually rather high. The
breakdowns suggest, however, that the dread of the Commission's ubiquity
is unfounded. If the Commission is called upon to consider plans in more
than the indicated number of cases, it will be because of judicial confi-
dence in the body rather than legislative coercion.
Not infrequently, the argument is advanced that the proposals for the
trustee's active participation and the Commission's advisory function in
formulating plans indicate "a lack of sympathy on the part of the Com-
mission with the proposition that a reorganization plan is in essence a
bargain between the various classes of security holders and creditors
and that the parties should be free to agree upon the terms of the bar-
gain, subject only to a judicial reView of a limited scope. '" D Implicit in
this observation is the conviction that under 77B, the theory of private
negotiations had been generally adopted. In addition to cases in which
courts had insisted upon inspecting plans before submitting them to
security holders,60 a common practice involved the submission of plans
to the scrutiny of special masters who sat not only in formal, detached
55. § 172. One of the first drafts of the Chandler Act [H. R. 6439 (1937) 58]
drew the line between mandatory and permissive references of reorganization plans at
$5,000,000.
56. House Hearings 287, statement of A. N. Heuston."
57. House Hearings 423.
58. These data have not been published. See note 25, supra.
59. See Dodd, supra note 43, at 232.
60. it re Long-Bell Lumber Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 113607 (W. D. Mo. 1935);
In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 16 F. Supp. 324 (E. D. N. Y. 1935) ; In re Pressed Steel
Car Co. of N. J., 16 F. Supp. 325 (W. D. Pa. 1936) ; (1936) 3 U. oF Cm. L. Rrv. 663.
And even in equity receiverships, courts had assumed jurisdiction, albeit reluctantly, of
plans. See Katz, Protection of Minority Bondholders in Foreclosures and Recciverships
(1936) 3 U. OF CHr. L. REv. 517, 527.
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judgment on the fairness of the plans but often sought to bring the
parties together by bargain and compromise, suggestion and argument.
If the office of the Commission and the functions of the trustee are con-
sidered as limitations on private negotiations, the common practice under
77B involved similar live limitations. The special master, no less than
the trustee or the Commission, was an officer of the court and just as
seriously shattered the deceptive pattern of private negotiations among
supposedly enlightened parties. The change from the 77B procedure
is not a shift in theoretical approach but in practical emphasis. Private
negotiations are now to be interrupted by analysts who recognize
the active play in reorganization between legal and business problems.
The Commission, with its experience under the Holding Company Act, 1
has an intimacy with reorganizations which will make its contribution
meaningful. In marked contrast to the Masters in Chancery, it is well-
equipped for the investigation and analysis necessary to assure thorough
performance of its functions.
Chapter Ten does not detail the Commission's work. In all likelihood,
the Commission will file reports, as special masters did in 77B. These
77B reports, while not drafted as counterplans, were by the nature of
their recommendations tantamount to amendments or counter proposals.
The prediction that this procedure will delay the reorganization pro-
ceedings may be accurate, 2 but whatever the disadvantages of delay,
they would seem to be offset by the advantages of analysis. The fear that
the new method will result in a shuttlecock betveen the Commission and
the courts seems altogether baseless. The report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, unlike that of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion under Section 77, is entirely advisory. The court need not wait upon
the Commission but may fix a reasonable time within which it must file
its report.63 But it is not to be expected that the courts will deny ex-
61. 49 STAT. 803 (1935); 15 U. S. C. § 79 (Supp. 1936). The admitted ability of
the personnel of the Commission and the display of the Commission's efficiency in public
utility reorganizations afford some assurance that the Commission will not duplicate the
uninspiring performance of the I.C.C. under § 77. See Comment (1937) 47 YAa L. J.
247, 254.
62. Cf. Chairman Douglas's "considered view that the recommendations for improve-
ment in the reorganization machinery, as embodied in the Chandler Bill, will not increase
the e pense of reorganizations or the time consumed to accomplish them." Senate
Hearings 125.
63. §§ 172, 173. Even before the enactment of the Chandler Act, courts had availed
themsdves of the Commission's services, [Testimony of N. Y. District Judge John C.
Knox, House Hearings 365] and thus recognized the potential usefulness of the Chandler
Act.: See Douglas, Improvement in Federal Procedure for Corporate Reorgan.:alions
(1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 875. Of the first five occasions on which the Commission inter-
vened under Chapter X, four were the result of invitations from district judges. N. Y.
Times, Nov. 16, 1938, p. 34, col. 2. Should the reports of the Commission carry great
weight, it will be because of respect for, not fear of, the S.E.C. Compare Swaine, supra
note 6, at 273; Minority Report, Senate Comnittee on Judidary 9 (June 7, 1938).
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tensions of time to the Commission when necessary. The Commission
acts not only as an arm of the court but as a representative of necessitous
security holders when it expresses its concept of the investor viewpoint.
In one or the other of these capacities, the Commission should be ac-
corded those rights which the law accords to private representatives of
organized security holders. Nor will the intervention of the S.E.C. lead
to centralization of proceedings in Washington. The Commission, recog-
nizing the predominantly local character of Chapter Ten cases, has
decentralized the work of its reorganization division by vesting in its
nine regional offices authority to appear in cases and to obtain the facts
required by the Commission in the preparation of its advisory reports.
Although the final form of the report is to be drafted in Washington,
and general policies established there, attorneys will not have to go to
Washington to present their cases, for the regional offices will be able
to conduct auxiliary hearings, if any are necessary.0 4 Speeches by mem-
bers of the Commission indicate that Washington blue prints of plans
for all reorganizations will not be drawn, but that each reorganization
will be regarded as an individual problem, to be solved in accordance
with the needs of the debtor and not without reference to the wishes of
the proponents of the scrutinized plans. 5
Chastening the Committees
As a consequence of the recommendations of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, made after a study of protective committees and
other representatives of security holders, the Lea Bill00 was introduced
in Congress. The Bill, which failed of passage at the last session, sub-
jects the solicitation of proxies and deposits in connection with any form
of reorganization or readjustment to increased legal control and establishes
specific fiduciary standards" for committees. The Chandler Act, in an-
ticipation of the Lea Bill's passage, required representatives of security
holders to comply with the requirements of all applicable laws before
participating in the proceedingsY7  Congress's concurrent consideration
of the Chandler and Lea Bills has caused some speculation whether Sec-
tion 213 does not through inadvertance require compliance with laws
64. S.E.C. Corp. Reorg. Release # 2. The regional offices of the S.E.C. are
situated in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Denver, Fort Worth, New York, San
Francisco and Seattle. On the basis of a number of applications filed under § 77B
during 1938, the Commission estimates that three-quarters of the Chapter X proceedings
will originate within the New York and Chicago regional offices.
65. Address of Chairman Douglas to the Nat'l Ass'n of Accredited Publicity
Directors, N. Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1938, p. 1, col. 3.
66. H. R. 6968, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). It is expected that the bill will be




other than those passed by Congress.6s Neither the intention of the
draftsmen, as understood by the Senate Judiciary committee"2 nor the
language of the section, which is phrased broadly enough to compel
representatives of security holders to meet the requirements of any ap-
plicable state and federal laws regulating their activities and personnel,
leave any room for doubt but that such compliance is necessary, and
intended by Congress. Apart from its reference to collateral legislation,
Chapter Ten strengthens judicial supervision of representatives in reor-
ganization by requiring all representatives (and the right to be represented
is otherwise unlimited) to satisfy certain qualifications. Anyone repre-
senting more than twelve creditors or stockholders, as well as every
indenture trustee, must satisfy specified informational requirements of
Section 211, while every attorney representing a security holder must
satisfy the requirements of Section 210. Obviously, the court should have
all pertinent information to aid it in competent control of the proceedings;
at the same time, some of the requirements of Chapter Ten seem un-
necessary. For instance, sub-section four of Section 211 provides that
all persons appearing in a representative capacity must show the claims,
and amounts thereof, represented by them. This requirement extends
not only to committees, as to whom it may be justified, but also to
indenture trustees. An indenture trustee, by hypothesis, occupies a unique
position as the representative of all claimants, and as to them the re-
quirements seem excessive. \Moreover, the effect of Section 211 is to
require disclosures by committees representing security holders numbering
more than twelve, whatever their amount, while not requiring disclosures
of committees representing a smaller number of security holders, even
though the holdings of the smaller group may be far in excess of those
for whom disclosures are necessary.
The power that committees have hitherto been able to wield through
legalistic, seductive deposit agreements has been considerably reduced by
the Chandler Act. Of common knowledge was the practice of securing
deposits of bonds under agreements which permitted the committee to be
completely inactive, and, at the same time, prevented depositors from
acting independently once they had deposited their bonds. The right to
withdraw, if recognized at all, was merely a formal, linguistic concession,
and the financial penalties for its exercise were substantial or prohibi-
tive.70 Section 77B developed a procedure, and Chapter Ten adopts it,
for handling deposit agreements in the same cavalier fashion that com-
68. See Gerdes, Corporate Reorganiations: Changes Effected by Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act (1938) 52 HAv. L. REv. 1, 27.
69. SEN. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (193S). Some state law provisions v hich vould
seem applicable are the security owner's protection law of California, [CAL. Guu. LAws
(Deering, 1937) Act 3S15], and the fiduciary law of Michigan. Mica. Pita. Acrs, No. 212
(1937).
70. Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 229.
1939] 587
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
mittees once used toward their depositors. Under both acts, the Judge
is authorized to scrutinize the agreement and disregard any provisions
which are either unfair or inconsistent with public policy.71 The tone of
the Chandler Act should encourage the courts to apply the "scrutiny"
section more boldly than they have done in the past. Through formu-
lation and enforcement of a vigorous public policy, the courts could
strengthen the fiduciary concept without waiting for the Lea Bill to
be passed, by requiring the excision of responsibility-denying clauses from
all agreements and by restraining the exercise of any powers under author-
izations for persons with conflicting interests. The powers of the court
to disregard committees entirely,72 to expunge all fee provisions from
deposit agreements and to deny to committees the right to interpret their
instruments and to amend their agreements at will, should be universally
recognized and generously exercised.
The powers of committees are further curtailed by prohibiting the
solicitation of acceptances for any plan until after transmittal of all duly
approved plans to security holders.7 3 This provision should furnish
security holders with a free and independent appraisal of the merits of
a plan, given by a judge unswayed by accumulations of votes and un-
dismayed by the prospects of undoing months of work."' Persons desir-
ing to form committees and to secure authority for the formulation of
plans may still do so but they can no longer obtain blanket, or even con-
ditional consents without having the acceptances declared invalid. It
would be optimistic to predict that under Chapter Ten courts will not
be influenced by advocates representing either large institutional interests
or committees. The existence of these bodies, before voting and during
the negotiations, and their activities in favor of certain plans, may be
71. § 77B (b) (10) ; Chapter X, § 212.
72. Recently, the Mississippi district court formulated its own plan and bludgeoned
tae committees into securing the requisite assents by threatening to dismiss them. In rc
Vicksburg Bridge & Terminal Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. U 4561 (D. Miss, 1937).
And in It re London Terrace Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. g 4561 (S. D. N. Y. 1937)
the federal court disallowed the compensation claim of a company, one of whose officers
had been restrained by the Kings County court from acting as a member of any reor-
ganization committee dealing with the debtor. See also In re Schroeder Hotel Co.,
86 F. (2d) 491 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; in re Wabash-Harrison Bldg. Corp., 85 F. (2d)
395 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; (1937) 46 YAI. L. J. 1391.
73. § 176. The court may, however, consent to solicitations before transmittal. Abid.
'The language of § 176 seems to preclude a ratifying consent; the consent of the court
must be requested, and received, before the solicitation. SEN. 1916 (1938) 31.
74. The disinclination of many courts to exercise independent judgment and their
inclination to approve a plan when confronted by the requisite majorities, regardless of
how obtained, were the reasons leading to the requirement of the court's pre-submisslon
approval. For recent examples of § 77B inertia see In re Baldwin Locomotive Works,
21 F. Supp. 94, 105 (E. D. Pa. 1937); In re A. C. Hotel Co., 93 F. (2d) 841, 843
(C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Gerdes, supra note 68, at 33, n. 191; Foster, Conflic tlg Idcals for
Reorganization (1935) 44 YALE L. J. 923, 929.
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forceful indications of their ability to obtain consents for, or dissents
against, any plan sent out by the court.
Not without basis, fear has been expressed that Section 176 will even
cause the invalidation of consents secured after transmittal of plans if,
previously, a premature attempt has been made to solicit consents.Y5 The
penalizing portion of Section 176 provides that any "authority or ac-
ceptance given, procured or received by reason of a solicitation prior to
. . . approval and transmittal shall be invalid, unless such consent of
the court has been so obtained." Any attempt to construe the section
to invalidate only acceptances received prior to the transmittal must prove
abortive in view of the change from the language of H. R. 64 3 9," which
did so provide, to the language now in the act, invalidating acceptances
procured by reason of a prior solicitation. However desirable it may be
to prevent the solicitation of acceptances and authorizations from security
holders who have not been acquainted with all of the facts pertinent to
the reorganization, there seems little reason to permit a prior solicitation
to defeat authorizations or acceptances given after all the facts have
transpired and after information has been transmitted to the security
holders. Consequently, the operation of Section 176 may be restricted
by construing the words "by reason of" in the penalizing phrase to in-
validate only such acceptances as are-shown to have been induced solely
by reason of the premature solicitation and not by any other reason.
Obviously, any such proof would be extremely difficult since the submittal
of the plan indicates the court's belief in the existence of other reasons
for acceptance. The use of the word "invalid" instead of the word
"void" in Section 176 makes it at least arguable that if no one objects
to the use of the premature consents, a plan approved on the basis of
such consents would not be vulnerable because grounded on improper
votes. When only one plan is submitted to security holders, as is likely
to prove true in most instances,77 it is improbable that the court will take
the initiative in nullifying the acceptances. In any event, if acceptances
are ignored as invalid, the court should regard them as not having been
voted in good faith, and should disqualify them for purposes of determin-
ing the necessary majority."8 Otherwise, a premature consent would
75. McCaffery, Corporate Reorganczation Under the Chandler Banhnrptcy Act,
(1938) 26 CALiF. L. REV. 643, 653.
76. H. R. 6439, 60, c. IV, § 2, I, d, (8) (d) (1937).
77. A plan must receive the approval of two-thirds of the creditors. § 179;
infra, p. 599. If more than one plan is submitted, all of course having received the
court's provisional approbation C§ 175), the difficulty of getting the requisite majority
may prove insurmountable. Judges are hardly likely to adopt a procedure that vAill
prolong the proceedings; they will probably submit but one plan at any given time. I re
Pressed Steel Car Co. of N. J., 16 F. Supp. 325, 327 CW. D. Pa. 1936).
78. § 203.
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operate to the complete prejudice of a plan by having the effect of a
vote against the plan."
II. SOCIALIZATION
The socialization or democratization of the reorganization process, long
an elusive goal for reformers, has in some measure been achieved in
Chapter Ten by presenting to investors opportunities for articulate par-
ticipation.80 Of course, the traditional inertia and indifference of security
holders may deprive some of the reforms of any practical significance.
But the Chandler Act cannot, any more than other statutes, coerce re-
course to its democratic techniques; its contribution is sufficient in the
creation of opportunities for participation. Yet in a few instances,
fortunately unimportant, the provisions in the new statute appear to
limit the democratic process. These departures involve such provisions
as the increase of the amount of petitioning creditors' claims from $1000
to $5000, s" the right of the court to appoint trustees before a hearing
is held, 2 its right to remove trustees without cause8 " and a perhaps undue
limitation on the right of bondholders to vote on plans."" In the main,
however, Chapter Ten has been infused with democratizing ideals. A
brief summary of the chronological formulation of a plan, in cases where
a trustee has been appointed, will offer a convenient background for a
closer study of the individual socializing influences.
Section 169 calls upon the trustee to formulate a plan within a time
fixed by the court, which also sets a date for a hearing on the plan, and
objections thereto. Notice of the hearing must be given to the debtor,
creditors, stockholders, indenture trustee, the S.E.C., and such other
persons as the court may designate.8 " The hearing date is then set, and the
trustee must notify creditors and stockholders that they may submit
to him proposals of their own."0 After considering all suggestions, the
trustee formulates a plan, files it with the court and then the hearing is
held, at which creditors may persist in presenting their own plans. After
79. If not more than one plan is submitted at any given time, the acquisition of
requisite consents to a plan should not be more difficult under Chapter X than under
§ 77B, even though consents are not solicited until a late stage in the reorganization
and committees have not been functioning as aggressively as under § 77B. The imposing
imprimatur of a court's approval will probably have respectable influence with security
holders and the modification of voting requirements will expedite the procurement of
consents. See Downtown Investment Co. v. Boston Metropolitan Buildings, Inc., 81 F.
(2d) 314, 322 (C. C.A. 1st, 1936).
80. Compare Swaine, supra note 6.
81. § 126; cf. §77B(a).
82. Supra, p. 578.
83. § 160.





this hearing the judge may, or must if more than $3,000,000 is involved,
submit to the S.E.C. for examination and report such plans as he regards
worthy of consideration. 7 Following the Commission's report or expira-
tion of the time for its submittal, the Judge may enter an order approving
such plans as he deems equitable and feasible and may fix a time within
which those affected may file acceptances."8 The trustee must then send
to all creditors and stockholders not only the proposed plans but a sum-
mary thereof, approved by the judge, and the report, or summary, of
the Securities and Exchange Commission.8" Upon acceptance of a plan
by two-thirds in amount of the claims filed and allowed, another hearing
for consideration of final confirmation is scheduled.", Either before or
after confirmation, the court may approve modifications in the plan
if no interests are adversely or materially affected. If parties in interest
will be adversely or materially affected, a hearing on the modifications
must be held and parties in interest given time to reject the modifica-
tions.9 1
Proposing Plans
At every step of the proceeding, from the submission to tie adoption
of plans, democratizing elements have been introduced, by increasing
either protection or participation for investors. 2 Under Section 77B the
right to submit plans was confined to groups of creditors or stockholders
who could muster substantial percentages of their classes. 3 To acquire
the required percentages, it was normally necessary to form committees.
The committees, it is well known, were generally organized at the insti-
gation of the insiders, management or bankers, who controlled the lists
of security holders.9 To reduce the power of these groups, Chapter Ten
throws the door wide open to complete investor participation by permit-
ting any creditor or stockholder to submit proposals and plans to the
trustee." At the same time, upon the recommendation of the S.E.C.,
the Chandler Act denies similar rights to the debtor, or more precisely,





91. § 222. A creditor who disapproves of a modification must file a written rejection
unless his acceptance was conditional on the absence of modifications. § 223.
92. Cf. Swaine, stpra note 6.
93. § 77B (d).
94. See statement of S.E.C. Chairman Douglas, House Hearings 170.
95. § 167(6). In accord with efforts to strengthen the indenture trustee's participa-
tion in the reorganization, § 170 permits him to file a plan when the debtor is left in
possession.
96. § 167(6). Statement of S.E.C. Chairman Douglas, House Hearings 172.
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strength of the debtor concept by identifying it with the management and
denying to the management, which has failed, the status accorded to
investors. If any member of the management is a security holder, he will
be able to file a plan in that capacity, but the management group as such
is denied special recognition. Whether or not the attempt to dispel the
debtor myth carries with it tangible benefits, the changes effected in
practice are likely to be inconsequential. Under Chapter Ten, as under
Section 77B, proponents of plans will probably meet to discuss all pro-
posals. Since by hypothesis the trustee is disinterested and by hope he
is independent and impartial, the origin of a particular plan should not
carry undue weight with him. Moreover, if the debtor has a right to
be heard on all matters and if the managers may submit plans as stock-
holders or creditors, little is left of the proposed distinction." And since
there is no objection to organization among security holders, manage-
ment may be expected to present a collective plan, with all the prestige
that the position gives it. The attempt to destroy influence of management
is completely frustrated by Section 169 which permits the debtor, along
with creditors and stockholders, to propose a plan after the trustee files
his. The result thus attained seems less desirable than permitting the
"debtor" to file a plan immediately along with security holders, since
strict adherence to the letter of Section 167 would result in postpone-
ment of the "debtor's" plan until after the trustee's plan has been sub-
mitted. An honest management, familiar with the business, may have
beneficial influence in the consideration and drafting of a plan, before
the trustee has been committed to a definite proposal. In practice, the
restrictions of Section 167(6) will probably be ignored and management
permitted to file plans because of the expedience of presenting all pro-
posals to the trustee before he files his own plan. The effort of the
Securities and Exchange Commission to weaken the identification of
management with the corporate entity could have been more successfully
realized by abandoning the use of the word "debtor" when manage-
ment was meant and by limiting "debtor" to references to the corporate
entity as the sum total of all investor interests.
Hearings, Intervention and Labor
In contrast to the formal limitations on the right to be heard in Sec-
tion 77B proceedings, Chapter Ten permits the debtor, indenture trustee,
and any creditor or stockholder to be heard on all matters. 8 In addi-
tion, Chapter Ten, like 77B, authorizes the judge to permit interested
parties, for cause shown, to intervene generally or specially.00 Although
the existence of a significant distinction between the "right" to be heard
97. § 206.




and the right to intervene has often been assumed,10 it is probable that
Chapter Ten erases whatever distinction, if any, existed under Section
77B, and makes the right to be heard and the right to intervene substan-
tially indistinguishable. The essential distinction between the two rights
under 77B was said to lie in the attachment of a privilege to appeal to,
and only to, the right to intervene. The right to be heard was therefore
considered an inadequate substitute for intervention because it did not
carry similar appellate privileges.' 0 ' But the cases relied upon for this
conclusion all seem to indicate not that the right to be heard does not
carry with it a privilege of appeal, but that the privilege of appeal is
denied only when the right to be heard does not exist. Section 77B (c)-
(11) conferred upon creditors and stockholders the right to be heard
on the permanent appointment of the trustee mid the proposed confirma-
tion of the reorganization plan and, upon granting of a petition to in-
tervene, on such other questions as the court might determine. Creditors
or stockholders under 77B therefore had a right to be heard on only
two questions; on other questions, any creditor or stockholder might be
heard if the court permitted. Security holders were permitted to appeal
without formal intervention on those matters on which they had a right
to be heard 0 . and only on other questions, where a mere opportunity
to be heard existed were creditors and stockholders denied appellate
privileges. The Seventh Circuit, where enough cases of this class have
been considered to create a pattern, has consistently dismissed appeals
where formal intervention was not granted and neither the confirmation
of a plan nor the appointment of a trustee was involved, upon the ground
that the creditor had no standing in court as a party to the suit.103 At
the same time, the opinions of the Court explicitly conceded that a creditor
100. See Levi and Moore, Federal Intervention: II. Ti Procedure, Status, and
Federal Jurisdictional Requirements (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 893, 935; WhVnsrrTr, BA z-
RuPTcy LAW oF 1938 (1938) 229; foonE, FEDmAL PRACricc (1938) 2404. In the sub-
sequent discussion, "right" and "privilege' are used synonymously without reference to
Hohfeldian distinctions.
101. Levi and Moore, supra note 100, at 936.
102. Farlee & Co., Inc. v. Springfield-South Main Realty Co., 86 F. (2d) 931 (C. C.A.
1st, 1936). The appellant had filed intervention petitions but they seem to have been
denied. Id. at 934. The appeal was taken from the confirmation of a plan. In In re
333 North Mich. Ave. Bldg. Corp., 84 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), several separate
appeals were taken from an order confirming a plan. There is no showing whether any
of the parties had intervened and the court does state that one of the appellants had been
denied intervention. Id. at 941. In In re Day & Meyer, Murray & Young, 93 F. (2d)
657 (C. C._A. 2d, 1938) the court heard an appeal from an order of confirmation by bond-
holders who had not formally intervened, citing In re Barclay Park Corp., 90 F. (2d)
595 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), wherein the district court's order of confirmation was reversed.
103. In re Trust No. 2988 of the Foreman Trust & Say. Bank, 85 F. (24) 942
(C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; In re Milwaukee & Sawyer Bldg. Corp., 79 F. (2d) 478 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935) ; B re Kennore-Granville Hotel Co., 92- F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
See also 1i; re 211 E. Delaware Pl. Bldg. Corp., 15 F. Supp. 947 (D. Ill. 1936).
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is a party to the reorganization as to those matters on which he has a
right to be heard. The Court recognized, as an appendage of that right,
the privilege to appeal.' In Matter of Kenniore-Granville Hotel Com-
pany,10 5 a non-intervenor attempted to appeal from an order of tile
district court confirming a plan of reorganization. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petitioner's appeal without opinion. The Supreme Court,
in its opinion, clearly indicated by reliance on Section 24b of the old
Bankruptcy Act that the appeal was dismissed because the appellant,
intervenor or not, had to proceed under Section 24b, governing appeals
relating to subject matters where the appeal rests within the discretion
of the court. The Court of Appeals itself admitted in a later case that
it had dismissed the Kenmore-Granville appeal in the exercise of its dis-
cretion under Section 24b and declared, as it had previously admitted,
that on those matters as to which creditors have a right to be heard, they
have a privilege to appeal.' Thus, the right to intervene is no more potent
than the right to be heard, when in fact the statute confers a right to be
heard. The right to intervene is greater than a "right" to be heard only
when the right to be heard does not exist. Since Section 206 of the new
Act gives the "debtor, the indenture trustee, and any creditor or stock-
holder" the right to be heard on all matters, the privilege to appeal will
exist as to all matters unless the courts, distressed by the possibilities of
numberless appeals by creditors having trifling financial interests, abandon
the structure erected by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.", If the
privilege to appeal is permitted to follow the right to be heard, formal in-
tervention will be unnecessary except for those who do not have a right to
be heard and except for those who want to avail themselves of preroga-
tives, other than appeal, which may be incident to intervention.108 The
act of a court in suffering someone to be heard, when that someone did
not have a right to be heard, does not serve as a substitute for either
that right or formal intervention. If the court wishes "to hear him as
an adviser, controller, or representative," it may do so, but this privilege
104. See note 103, supra.
105. 297 U. S. 160 (1936), arfli-ining, 78 F. (2d) 1018 (C. C.A. 7th, 1936).
106. In re Kenmore-Granville Hotel Co., 92 F. (2d) 778 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937).
107. It has been held that the right to be heard on all matters, granted to security
holders under § 77 does not make them parties to the cause. In re Denver & R. G. NV.
R. R., 13 F. Supp. 821, 823 (D. Colo. 1936). The Denver case is not directly applicable
to the discussion here because, apart from its being a § 77 case, it did not involve the
privilege to appeal. The danger of appeals by those representing minute clainis is no
greater than under § 77B because all appeals involving less than $500 require allowance
of the appellate court. § 24; see Gerdes, supra note 68, at 25. Moreover, one who
does not exercise his right to be heard should be denied the privilege to appeal.
108. Intervenors may be entitled to notice of matters of which all security holders
need not be informed [see In re Paramount Publix Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 4130
(S. D. N. Y. 1934)] or to initiate proceedings without court consent. In re Denver &
R. G. W. R. R., 13 F. Supp. 821 (D. Colo. 1936).
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does not "give him the right to appeal as a party from the decree of
the court."'°  This statement, phrased long before the introduction of
the Chandler Bill, constitutes a prescient portrayal of the status to be
occupied by labor, as representative or economic adviser, and by the
S.E.C., as amicus curiae."10
One of the most controversial features of the effort to socialize reor-
ganization proceedings was the attempt to confer upon labor unions, em-
ployees' associations and other representatives of those in the. debtor's
employment, a right to be heard on the economic soundness of any plan.11
This attempt met immediate opposition based either upon doctrinal doubts
as to labor's property interest in its job or on figmentive fears of sit down
strikes in court houses and picketing of judges." 2 The resistance to
giving labor a forum for the expression of its views on matters that
affect its interests as vitally as the interests of investors represents the
traditional reluctance to allowing labor a share in shaping policies of
industrial control. An employee who has worked at a job for a period
of time has supplied "service capital" as his investment in the enter-
prise.1. 3 Suspension or reduction of business leads to labor displacement,
a loss as great as a loss of invested funds. Labor's interest, time and
effort having contributed to the manufacture, distribution and sale of
the corporation's products or services," 4 labor should be given an interest
sufficient to invest it with a right to be heard on the economic soundness
of a plan and other matters. The arguments in favor of giving manage-
ment a voice, not because of any pecuniary interest in the business but
because of its insight and information, would appear applicable to labor,
which is further motivated by a sincere desire to secure a corporate
structure that has promise of solvency and ability to pay a decent wage.
Despite the fact that the proposed "right" would simply have been a
recognition of what some courts, without Congressional action, had been
doing," ' it was diluted in the final bill into giving labor an opportunity
109. Public Service Comm. of Pa. v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., S2 F. (2d)
481, 487 (C. C.A. 3d, 1935); In re Kenmore-Granville Hotel Co., 92 F. (2d) 778
(C.C.A. 7th, 1937).
110. § 208 specifically denies to the Commission the privilege of appeal. Supra, p. 583.
For the ainicu s curiae characterization see Senate Hearings 11. The hearings also indi-
cate that one of the reasons for denying to labor a right to be heard was the fear that,
on the basis of it, labor might gain the privilege of appeal. See colloquy between Congress-
man Celler and Chairman Douglas, House Hearings 192.
111. H. R. 6439, c. IV, §2(11) h(S) (1937).
112. Congressman Michener, House Hearings 190, 194, 195; Congressman Towey,
House Hearings 192-193.
113. See Green, Case for the Sit-Down Strike (March, 1937) 90 Naw RnUIic 199.
114. This view is expressed in the foreword of an annual report issued by Johns-
Manville Corporation to its employees. (1938) 46 MoTHLY LAn. REv. 1147.
115. Statement of Commissioner Douglas, House Hearings 195. In some instances,
judges have appointed representatives of labor on the directorial boards of the reor-
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to be heard if the judge, upon cause shown, so permits. Chapter Ten
therefore does little to recognize explicitly that labor has any claim on
the industrial organization by virtue of a contribution different from,
but equal to, that of security holders.
Organized employees will have a more advantageous status than un-
organized employees in reorganization hearings. Where labor has a col-
lective bargaining contract with the debtor, it can probably come into
the proceeding as a creditor within the meaning of Section 106, entitled
not only to be heard as a matter of right but to vote upon the plan of
rehabilitation."' Labor has other rights under Chapter Ten. Section 272
embodies the now conventional provision preserving to employees the
right to join unions of their own choice."' The same section also pro-
tects employees in their refusal to join, or to remain members of, a
company union. Thus, the section explicitly destroys the binding nature
of membership in a company union and implicitly protects contracts of
legitimate unions by not guaranteeing the right of employees to remain
outside of non-company unions. Despite the liberality of the labor pro-
visions, attempts will no doubt be made under Chapter Ten, as they were
under 77B, to use the reorganization machinery for insulation from dis-
turbing labor problems or for termination of annoying union contracts. 118
Although as a matter of statutory construction, the perfunctory rejection
of labor contracts would not be impossible,"' it would, as a matter of
practical expediency, be impolitic. Contracts between employers and em-
ployees represent dynamic relationships; the rejection of such contracts
does not end the relation but merely begins a new phase, a phase that
may be marked by compromise or strife, contract or strike. Since the
reorganization proceedings probably do not deprive labor of rights granted
it by state, or other federal laws, 20 the rejection of such contracts should
ganized corporations. In the Matter of Pettibone Mulliken, Bankruptcy Docket No.
61011 (E. Div. N. D. Ill. 1937). Congressman Celler stated that labor unions might
b& included by court order within the class of persons to whom notices were to be sent
under what is now § 120, and might be considered parties in interest within § 207 and
permitted to intervene. House Hearings 191, 192.
116. Holders of executory contracts were considered creditors under § 77B (c) (10).
Globe Grain & Milling Co. v. American Marine Products Co., 91 F. (2d) 380 (C. C. A.
9th, 1937).
117. §77B(1), (m), 11 U.S.C. §207(1), (m) (1934); §77(p), (q), §11 U.S.C.
205 (p), (q) (1936).
118. In. re Cleveland & Sandusky Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 198, 207 (N. D. Ohio
1935); In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); In re
Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc., (D. Mass. 1935) [unreported, but discussed in 2 N.L.R.B.
802 (1937)]. See Witmer, Collective Labor Agreements in the Courts (1938) 48 YALE
L. J. 195, 222.
119. Section 70 permits trustees to reject or assume executory contracts; §216(4)
permits a plan to contain provisions rejecting any contract not in the public authority.
120. See (1935) 45 YALE L. J. 372; (1935) 35 CoL. L. REv. 1140; National Labor
Relations Act § 14, 49 STAT. 457, 29 U. S. C. § 164 (Supp. 1934).
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be preceded by hearings and conferences to canvass the necessity for, and
consequences of, rejection. Nor should the operation of the debtor under
the aegis of the court deprive labor of its right to protest, before the
appropriate administrative tribunal, the management's unfair labor prac-
tices."' In one case at least, this privilege was rendered meaningless by
a court which refused to make the reorganized corporation expressly
answerable for the debtor's unfair labor practices, by professing its
inability to formulate another plan and by protesting the inexpediency
of modifying a plan for which the requisite acceptances had already been
obtained.1 2 The "public policy" concept in Chapter Ten can reasonably
be utilized to prevent such results in the future by requiring the adjust-
ment of all labor difficulties before the final consummation of any plan.y
Information to Investors
One of the most effective weapons of the reorganization managers was
their control over security lists. In reorganizations, either in equity or
77B, the committee representing management and bankers had almost
exclusive access to the names of security holders, making it possible for
the committee to communicate with investors long before opposition
groups were even organized. 4 Chapter Ten reflects the belief that in-
creased knowledge both of company affairs and the identity of con-
temporary investors, by increasing opportunities for independent organ-
ization, is a most effective antidote against management's self-perpetuating
tendencies. It establishes a theoretical level of equality by making the
names of investors accessible to all security holders. 12 5 When a trustee
is appointed, he must file in court a list of all creditors."20 If the judge
believes that a list of security holders in another's possession is necessary
to complement the trustee's list, the judge may order the possessor of
the list either to produce it or to make it available for use. The list
compiled by the trustee is open to inspection by bona fide security holders
on such terms as the court may prescribe. This latter qualification, that
the court may prescribe conditions for use of the lists, is but a precau-
tionary phrase empowering the court to demand proof that the lists are
121. it re Ralph A. Freundlich, Inc.; In re Luckenbach Steamship Co., Prentice-
Hall (1937) Labor Serv. U 15,575.2.
122. In re Baldwin Locomotive Works, Prentice-Hall (1938) Labor Serv. ir 16,137
(E. D. Pa. 1938).
123. For amplification of "public policy" see infra, p. 607. In the Freundlich case,
cited supra note 118, the plan provided that the order of the N.L.R.B. should be of full
force and effect against the new corporation. See 2 N.L.R.B. S02, S04 (1937).
124. Spaeth and Friedberg, Early Developmwnts under Section 77B (1935) 30 I..
L. RE;. 137, 145; statement of Chairman Douglas, House Hcarings 1SS.
125. §§ 164-166 establish and qualify the rights of security holders to use lists.
126. When the debtor is left in possession, it must file not only a list of creditors
and stockholders but detailed schedules of its property. § 163.
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not to be misused by reorganization racketeers or by profiteering peddlers
of "sucker lists." The court may even deny to bona fide security holders
the right to inspect the lists if, instead, it allows the security holder to
communicate with the other investors through the offices of the court,
This experiment, initiated in New York by Judge Lockwood, prevents
the misuse of the security lists while at the same time permitting litera-
ture to be freely transmitted to investors on the lists. 27
Equally as important as the list sections of the Act are the report
provisions, which are designed to ensure that both the court and security
holders will be supplied with information about the status of the debtor.
When a trustee is appointed he must submit a brief statement of his
investigation of the property, liabilities and financial condition of the
debtor, and a recommendation concerning the desirability of continuing
the operations of the corporation. The language of Section 167(5)
is destined to create some difficulty in determining whether the report
mentioned therein must be submitted in every case in which a trustee is
appointed or only in those cases where an investigation is ordered pur-
suant to subsection (1). That the report referred to in subsection (5)
is unconnected with any investigation under the first subsection would
seem to follow from the separate provision for a report in subsection
(1). Moreover, the report required under subsection (1) is designed
to disclose whether there has been any misconduct on the management's
part, and is to be submitted to the court only; the report described in
subsection (5) would seem to have as its primary reference a considera-
tion of the debtor's condition, and is to be sent not only to the judge
but to security holders and others who desire to use that information
before or after plans are submitted. 28
Another step in the enlightenment of investors is taken under Section
190, which provides that the trustee or debtor in possession must file
annual reports, copies of which are to be sent to security holders. And
Section 189 permits the court to demand interim reports of the debtor's
operations, the reports to be open to inspection at all times by parties
in interest. The progress of the debtor is so important that monthly
earning reports should be required. Especially in the case of debtors in
possession, where the hazards of disastrous financial management are
particularly great, should monthly histories of the company's operations
127. Statement of Judge Knox, House Hearings 369; House Hearings 187. Courts
in § 77B identified availability of lists with public policy. Herbert V. Apartments Corp.
v. Mortgage Guarantee Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 151,329 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938). But
the statute was prejudicially defective in failing to provide for the compilation of lists
by a court officer. Comment (1937) 47 YALE L. J. 229, 236.
128. Cf. WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938 (1938) 216. Mr. Weinstein
amended subsection (5) to read that the trustee shall submit a "brief statement of hIls
investigations under paragraph (1). . . . " The act does not contain any reference
in subsection 5 to paragraph 1. H. R. 8046, § 167.
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be furnished. The management should be obliged to file periodical state-
ments of receipts and disbursements, setting forth all items of loss and
showing the advisability of continuing the business in the light of results
achieved and anticipated.' 2' Regular exposure of the affairs of the debtor
and the history of the management's operations would do much to ensure
honest administration.
Claims and Votes
The immediate objective of any reorganization proceeding is to obtain
the necessary number of consents. Although a court may force a plan
upon an unwilling majority, its indisposition to act under a section of
doubtful constitutionality and its inclination to respect the judgment of
security holders will ordinarily operate to prevent confirmation of a plan
that has not received the requisite number of consents. 30 The procedure
for procuring the necessary number of favorable votes is therefore of
no little importance. In the history of early reorganizations, the right
of an indenture trustee to file claims on behalf of security holders who
had not filed on their own behalf was, for some time, in doubt. Although
the urge to protect uninformed bondholders was ultimately strong enough
to win judicial recognition for the trustee's right to file claims for all
bondholders, subject to reduction to the extent of claims filed by the
holders themselves,'31 the Chandler Act sought to make the existence of
this right unequivocal in Section 198. The act tried to do even more
by modifying the calculation of voting majorities to favor the approval
of the plan. Since Section 77B(e) (1) required consents of 2/3 of all
claims allowed, and since claims filed by the trustee were "allowed claims,"
the consents of 2/3 of all creditors, and not only of those who filed
individual claims, were necessary. Adoption of such a majority standard,
which required balloting by bondholders, including the indifferent or
ignorant, unknown or unlisted, made difficult the task of getting the
requisite number of consents for even the fairest of plans. 32 Such diffi-
129. Rule X-14 of Bankruptcy Rules (S. D. N. Y. Sept. 28, 1938) requires trustees
and debtors to file monthly reports and summaries. The report must include a classified
statement of receipts and disbursements, indebtedness incurred, credit extended, obliga-
tions assumed and such other matters as the judge may specify. The S.E.C. may
recommend the forms of reports. § 190. See also (April 27, 1936) TmE M ,G. 72. The
reports should, of course, be available for ex-amination to all securit),holders and the
S.E.C.
130. It re Tennessee Publishing Co., 81 F. (2d) 463 (C.C. A. 6th, 1936), aff'd on
other grounds, 299 U. S. 13 (1936) ; Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Develop-
ment Co., 87 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); see In re Granville & Winthrop Bldg.
Corp., 87 F. (2d) 101, 102 (C. C.A. 7th, 1936).
131. In re Allied Owners' Corp., 74 F. (2d) 201 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; (1935) 2 U. or
CHL L. REv. 644.
13Z Report of Special Comisel to Senate Connitee, supra note 14, at 34.
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culties could have been avoided by permitting the trustee to vote on
behalf of non-voting bondholders, but reluctance to permit the modifi-
cation of creditors' rights by third persons, distrust of the corporate
trustee's ability to perform the function properly, and doubt as to the
desirability of imposing unforeseen fiduciary obligations upon trustees
participating in the formulation of reorganization plans led to general
denial of the trustee's right to vote.' To obviate the consequences of
making the total outstanding debt the basis for majority computations
while denying voting privileges to the indenture trustee, a proviso was
added to Section 198 to the effect that "in computing the majority neces-
sary for the acceptance of the plan only the claims filed by the holders
thereof, and allowed, shall be included." While this section facilitates
the securing of consents, it severely reduces the number of bondholders
entitled to vote on a plan. Section 179 provides that the consents of 2/3
of the claims allowed shall be necessary for adoption of the plan. Since
Section 198 provides that only claims filed by individual bondholders and
allowed by the court shall be taken into consideration in determining the
voting base, the conclusion necessarily follows that only those who filed
individual claims are entitled to vote. Were Sections 179 and 198 con-
strued not to limit the voting basis in this manner, paradoxical results
might follow, for a plan could receive the approval of 2/3 of those whose
claims are counted within Section 198 and yet not 2/3 of the total num-
ber of votes cast by all security holders.
The effect of Section 198 is to lead to an unnecessary limitation on
the democratic techniques which the draftsmen otherwise sought to in-
troduce. Experience has shown that many bondholders are either in-
different or rely on corporate trustees to file claims for them, so that
the number of self-filers is likely to be small.' To limit the right to
vote to this self-filing group would, in many instances, mean that the
vote was not representative, and would make it possible for an extremely
small proportion of an entire bond issue to reach decisions conclusive not
only on the indifferent non-voters but upon those who were not aware
they were losing their right to vote when they permitted the trustee to
file for them.'
133. In re Prudence Co., 22 F. Supp. 264 (S. D. N. Y. 1938); (1935) 2 U. or Cut.
L. REv. 644.
134. Gerdes, supra note 68, at 456. The task of filing claims of individual security
holders having been made more difficult under Chapter X of the Chandler Act (§§ 57,
196), it may be expected that the trustee will be relied upon to safeguard the interests
of bondholders. Heuston, Corporate Reorganization Under Chapter X of the Chandler
Act (1938) 38 CoL. L. REv. 1199, 1223, n. 122.
135. This argument presupposes that bondholders are aware that the trustee may file
for them and yet excusably unaware that only self-filers may vote, a limitation which
did not exist in the practice under § 77B. Supra, p. 599. It must be conceded, how-
ever, that the rubric that everyone is presumed to know the law may be pressed to
the point of expecting bondholders to know that their non-filing will disenfranchise them.
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It may be urged that such a result will not operate to the noticeable
prejudice of security holders, because the interests of all parties are still
protected by a judicial, and sometimes, in addition, an administrative
agency, which passes upon the fairness of a plan before sending it out
for acceptances. But however genuine the protection afforded by a court's
informed and impartial appraisal of a plan, limitations on independent
expressions of creditors' views should not be unnecessarily imposed. The
considered judgment of all bondholders, and not only of those who filed,
although the expressed right of the trustee to file made it unnecessary
for them to do so, should be weighed in determining whether a plan has
been accepted. Moreover, the method of calculation established in Chapter
Ten unduly favors opponents of a plan by treating indecision or indiffer-
ence like opposition. A more familiar democratic technique should be
adopted, that of permitting all bondholders to vote, whether or not they
filed claims for themselves, and of calculating the requisite majority on
the basis of the number of votes cast. This technique would not make
a neutral silence tantamount to a negative vote nor innocent reliance upon
a trustee's duty a disenfranchising pitfall. Amendment of Sections 179
and 198 to avoid this paradox of disenfranchisement would be desirable.
Failing such amendment, it might still be possible to avoid either of these
results by arguing that since the trustee files as agent of the bondholders,
the act of voting by the security holders is merely a reassertion of their
claim, and they should be considered to have filed within the intendment
of Section 198.
Fair Practices
The purge of the reorganization procedure has not stopped with man-
agement and bankers but has extended to any parties violating the ordinary
standards of investor morality. Under Section 77B some courts felt
themselves powerless to dispose adequately of cases wherein claims were
purchased for the purpose of blocking reorganizations."' Chapter Ten
renders such tactics innocuous by permitting the judge, for the purpose
of determining the requisite majority for acceptance of a plan, to dis-
qualify any vote not exercised in good faith.1 T Like good faith in filing
of petitions, good faith in accepting or not accepting a plan is a concept
of uncertain content. As a minimum requirenent, the courts should
136. Texas Hotel Securities Corp. v. Waco Development Co., 87 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A.
5th, 1936); cf. Report of Special Master Jacob I. Grossman in In rc Hoyne Manor
Corp., Bankr. Docket No. 60753 (E. D. N. D. Ill. Jan., 1937) (bondholder denied the
right to withdraw either his consent to a plan or his claim when the request vras made
pursuant to a bargain between the consentor and a committee attempting to block the
reorganization), af'd, 92 F. (2d) 822 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937), cert. dismissed sb. norn.
Ex parte Heymann, 302 U. S. 653 (1937).
137. §203; and see §221(3).
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.demand -honesty of object and propriety of motive.""' If the primary
purpose of the voter is not the protection of his interest as an investor
but the attainment of some private end, if his vote is not based on his
views as to the feasibility or fairness of the plan but on a desire to exact
tribute by threatening obstruction, his conduct could be characterized as
in bad faith. The fact that securities were purchased shortly before the
reorganization proceedings or at depressed prices should not foreclose
the question of good faith. If, however, the claims were purchased to
qualify the claimant for participation in a pending or imminent reorgan-
ization, the claimant's objective, the identity of the claimant's associates,
as well as the question, of whose money was used in payment for the
securities, would be material to final determination, because in such
cases a finding that the purchase was made to acquire a nuisance value
or to create a hold-up would not be unfounded.189
Tangent to this reform was the recommendation of the S.E.C., em-
bodied in the first drafts of the Chandler Bill, that compensation for
services or reimbursement for expenses should be denied to any person
who sold or purchased securities in contemplation, or after the com-
mencement, of reorganization proceedings. 4 ' This effort to discourage
trading in securities by fiduciaries by penalizing the practice represented
a codification of rules independently established by some courts under
Section 77B. 4' The viscissitudes of Congressional treatment resulted,
however, in a modification of the original language and the framing of
a substitute section which offers opportunities for interpretation that
would defeat the object of the initial recommendation. The substitute
provision, Section 249, consists of two sentences. The first requires that
anyone seeking compensation or reimbursement must file a statement
showing what securities he sold or bought after the commencement of the
proceedings; the second contains a denial of compensation or reimburse-
ment to any person acting in a representative or fiduciary capacity in the
proceedings who bought or sold such securities without the consent or
approval of the judge. Whatever else it may do, Section 249 does not
make purchases by insiders subject to penalty if the court consents. While
138. See Comment (1934) 48 HAgv. L. REv. 283, for discussion of good faith require-
ment under § 77B. "Good faith" remains undefined under Chapter X, although four
instances of a petition not in good faith are set forth in § 146.
It may be argued that honesty and propriety of judgment should be both the minimum
and maximum requirement and that consideration of other factors, such as the reason-
ableness of the objections, would trench too deeply into the rights of security holders,
For discussion of whether an unreasonable but honest objector should be recognized
see House Hearings 181.
139. Dodd, supra note 43.
140. H. R. 6439, c. IV, § 12(II)e(9) (1937) 65.
141. In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 12 F. Supp. 823, 828 (S. D. N. Y. 1935) ; In re
Republic Gas Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. f1 4104 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); 4l. Donnelly v,
Consolidated Investment Trust, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 51,382 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938).
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the amendment relating to consent was probably designed to avert penal-
izing those who acquired securities by gift, inheritance or other methods
that do not involve fiduciary relations,142 its language is broad enough to
compel the courts to inquire into every transfer of securities to determine
whether it involved the use of inside information or the transgression of
fiduciary duties. Perhaps unwittingly and unnecessarily, the section places
administrative duty of considerable magnitude upon the judge. The
danger that judges, to avoid these administrative burdens, may blink at
the fiduciary practices and permit an unexpected expansion of the excep-
tion is not illusory. 14 3 A broader, safer rule has thus been narrowed in
scope and made difficult in application. Furthermore, the fact that Section
249 imposes informational requirements only as to securities purchased
after commencement of the proceedings and the fact that the second
sentence of Section 249 imposes penalties only on transfers after the
claimant has assumed to act in a representative or fiduciary capacity may
invite misinterpretations and misconstructions. A speculating member
of a committee which has not yet contacted security holders might avail
himself of inside information to traffic in securities of the debtor. Man-
agement, or officers of the debtor, by virtue of their knowledge of business
conditions or foreknowledge of a contemplated reorganization, might
also transfer claims and securities, later contending that they had not
as yet assumed fiduciary or representative capacities; and all of them
might contend that since the informational requirements were limited to
purchases after commencement of the proceedings, the penalties of Sec-
tion 249 were also thus limited. This is not to say that Section 249 fails
to achieve a worthwhile reform, for it does presage the proscription of
practices that amounted to flagrant violations of the fiduciary concept. It
does not, however, completely foreclose evasion by sophisticated refine-
ments and subtle impingements.'"
Fees
Allowance of fees to counsel and committees has become one of the
perennial problems of reorganization proceedings. Coincident with the
tendency to increase court supervision of the fairness of plans has been
142. Statement of John Gerdes, House Hearings 312.
143. In Donnelly v. Consolidated Investment Trust, C. C. . Bankr. Serv. 51,382
(C. C. A. 1st, 1938), the court condoned the trustee's purchase of stoc.L
144. These techniques are illustrated under § 77B in Security-First Natl Bank of
Los Angeles v. Ridge Land & Navig. Co., 85 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936) ; In re
Celotex Co., 12 F. Supp. 1 (D. Del. 1935). To some ex\tent the loopholes of §249
are closed by § 212 which prohibits trafficking in claims in contemplation of reorganization.
Claims purchased in contemplation are to be limited to the actual consideration paid for
them. Whether trading in the securities of a subsidiary whose parent is being reor-
ganized will be prohibited is not explicitly determined. See MeCaffery, sipra note 75,
at 659.
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the tendency to enlarge the class of those eligible for compensation for
their services, and both tendencies reflect an increasing recognition that
reorganization should not continue as a monopoly of insiders. Before
the enactment of Section 77B, the rights of independent and minority
groups to reimbursement for expenses incurred and compensation for
services rendered received scant acknowledgment. The language of Sec-
tion 77B promised greater liberality of treatment for minority groups,
but judges, conditioned to management monopoly, unsympathetically
construed the statute to minimize the rights of independents. 4 Chapter
Ten, having been drawn to increase investor participation and to permit
minority organization, unambiguously recognizes the compensatory rights
of minorities doing valuable work, whether such work be in opposition to
or in support of a plan. Section 242, one of several sections pertaining to
fees, provides, inter alia, that the judge may allow reasonable compensa-
tion for services rendered in connection with a plan, either provisionally or
finally approved by the judge, whether or not it is accepted by security
holders. And Section 243 permits the allowance of reasonable com-
pensation for services which contributed to the confirmation, or refusal
to confirm, a plan. Independents thus achieve a definite status and may
be awarded compensation when their opposition to any plan results in
its amendment or abandonment. Although these sections have been de-
nounced as "Christmas tree" gifts, 14 they are far from that. The
language of Chapter Ten allows compensation only for services which
are sufficiently effective to result in the adoption or rejection of a plan.
Compensation for services that attain tangible results cannot temperately
be considered a gift. The identity of an unattached performer in the
reorganization arena should not forestall fair compensation for a meritori-
ous performance. Nor will Section 241, which permits the allowance of
fees to petitioning creditors, necessarily lead to the filing of involuntary
petitions by creditors whose sole object is to obtain fees. The section
having been phrased in permissive language, the court may in its dis-
cretion deny fees if it dismisses the petition for lack of good faith.147
The most vexing fee problems under Section 77B involved not so
much the types of service for which reimbursement should be permitted,
145. Comment (1936) 3 U. oF Cni. L. REv. 476.
146. Statement of Garrett A. Brownback, Senate Hearings 91.
147. In it re Wilkes-Barre Hotel Co., 17 F. Supp. 875 (M. D. Pa. 1937), a debtor
unsuccessfully sought to recover counsel fees incurred in securing the dismissal of an
involuntary petition. Some doubtful questions of § 77B are answered under Chapter X.
Thus, § 246 authorizes the payment of fees upon dismissal of proceedings. In re Old
Algiers, Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 151,487 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). § 243 permits com-
pensation for objections to plans. Contra: (under § 77B) In re Geiser Mfg. Co., 23 F.
Supp. 482 (M. D. Pa. 1938). § 244 permits compensation for services during prior
bankruptcy proceeding. Contra: (under § 77B) In re United Cigar Stores Co., 21 F.
Supp. 869 (S. D. N. Y. 1937). Chapter X fails, however, to clarify the power of the
federal court to modify fees allowed in prior proceedings.
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but the amounts for which they were to be rewarded. The Chandler Act
does not advance a formula for determining what amounts are to be
allowed, because the reasonable value of services, no less than the qualities
of a reasonable man or the essence of a reasonable regulation are not
susceptible to compression within a formula. Knotty, new points may
appear in the course of administering the fee provisions, but the funda-
mental problem will remain to keep fee allowances from becoming ex-
cessive. Among both lawmen and laymen the fees demanded by reor-
ganization counsel have been caustically condemned as confiscatory and
exorbitant. 4 ' But the excessiveness of allowances and the amounts spent
for legal services in a reorganization are not so much the result of im-
moderateness of single requests as of their collective number. Numerous
counsel intervene to represent numerous parties and numerous requests
for fees are filed. Each counsel, adopting as the pecuniary standard for
his requests a figure that will compensate him for his time and office
overhead, will then take into consideration the number of hours spent
on the case, rather than the intrinsic value of his contribution to the
reorganization. The problem of preventing the estate from being dis-
tributed among counsel becomes especially acute under Chapter Ten,
because of its provisions expanding the class of eligible recipients of
fees, and its solution may require the disallowance of fees for all services
except those which represent some definite individual contribution to the
approval, adoption or rejection of a plan or to the administration of the
estate. 49 This policy would concede the desirability of permitting free
intervention for all, but would not concede the desirability of compensating
those who either have nothing to contribute to the reorganization apart
from their attendance at hearings and conferences, or whose contributions
are duplications of other services. In deciding whose services were not
duplicatory, preference would be given to those upon whom primary
responsibility for performing the services rested. Thus, in the adminis-
tration of the estate, the initial responsibility rests upon the debtor or
the trustee, and they should be compensated for their services while dupli-
148. The lawmen: ARNOLD, FoLxLORE op CAxMAusus (1937) 258; Remington, Some
Seriorts Defects of § 77B (1936) 2 Coap. RFOG. MAG. 414, 421. The laymen: L.o, The
Poor Lawyer (July 11, 1936) Bus. ,Vax 39; (Nov. 4, 1935) TmE MAo. 74; Markey,
Reporter At Large (Aug. 3, 1935) NEav YoRmz.
149. Some courts have found it expedient to determine the percentage of the debtor's
assets to be allocated among all claimants before determining individual allowances.
In re 211 E. Delaware P1. Bldg. Corp., 13 F. Supp. 473 (N. D. Ill. 1936); In re Irving
Austin Bldg. Corp., 22 F. Supp. 583 (N. D. Ill. 1937); In re 101 AV. Thirty-first St.
Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. U 4152 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) (6% allowed); In re Madison
Corp., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. V4965 (S. D. N. Y. 1938) (court fixed 6% of value
of the outstanding securities as the maximum total). By adopting, as a matter of local
district court rules, a percentage scale to guide, but not to bind, the judges, the courts
may give a greater prophylactic effect to that technique.
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cators should be denied allowances.' If those primarily responsible fail
to perform their duties, or are only prodded into performance by others,
those others should be compensated. The considerations relevant to
compensation for services rendered in administering an estate are equally
relevant to the consideration of services connected with plans. The prob-
lem of duplicating services seems no different in this connection and should
be treated in the same manner. If it be argued that this approach will
subvert the purpose of the Chandler Act by discouraging independent
participation by those dependent on court allowances for their compen-
sation, two answers may be made: first, it was probably the intention
of the Commission in proposing, and Congress in enacting these free-
participation provisions not that every security holder would intervene,
but only those who felt they had something to offer. For those that do
have something to offer, the compensation provisions and procedure are
sufficiently wide. Moreover, contingent fees are not so strange to the
legal profession in other fields as to make them entirely unacceptable in
reorganizations. 5'
More important for independents than a change in statutory provisions
would be a change in judicial attitude. In 77B cases (and these are rare
indeed) where independents were compensated for services admittedly
beneficial, the courts generally adopted a most grudging attitude and made
allowances that seemed, on the basis of the reported facts, to compare
unfavorably with allowances made to others in the cause.15 2 To carry
over into Chapter Ten this discriminatory attitude would be to flaunt the
legislative intent and to frustrate the equalizing attempt. A realistic
attitude would require the reorganization atmosphere to be cleared of
150. See it re United Cigar Stores Co. of Am. 21 F. Supp. 869, 875, 879 (S, D.
N. Y. 1937).
Allowances for duplicatory services have been denied and criticized. Steere v.
Baldwin Locomotive Works, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 51,325 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938) ; In re
Prudence Co., Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1151,333 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938); IN re National
Department Stores, 11 F. Supp. 633, 638 (D. Del. 1935); In re Starrett Corp., 92 F.
(2d) 375 (C.C. A. 3d, 1937); Sullivan & Cromwell v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Co.,
96 F. (2d) 219 (C. C.A. 10th, 1938).
151. For contingent fee arrangements in § 77B reorganizations see In re Prudential
Milk Co., Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 4360 (S. D. N. Y. 1936); It re McCrory Stores
Corp., 91 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
152. it re Consolidated Motor Parts, 85 F. (2d) 579 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936) (compensa-
tion for an objector must bear fair proportion to the claims he represented) ; In re Center
Court Apartments, 22 F. Supp. 675 (W. D. Pa. 1937) (objector who successfully opposed
an initial, and unsuccessfully opposed a final, plan was allowed only expenses) ; it re
Wilsea Works, C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 14051 (W. D. N. J. 1936) (the court queried
whether successful objectors would be compensated). The timid hope has been expressed
that under the new act, judges will not make allowances to hallowed names that perform
formalities, but should pay for services actually rendered, though counsel be "actuated
by the mundane desire to make a living." Jackson, A Rcalistic Approach to Amendment
of §77B of the National Banknptcy Act (1937) 3 CorP. REORG. 311, 320.
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the distinction between services rendered in the interest of the estate and
services in the interest of a client, and it is around this distinction that
disallowance to independents have been rationalized and allowances to
committees justified.1"3 Lawyers render services to clients who are inter-
ested in preserving their own interests, but whether the clients hold a
-substantial percentage of the securities or but a qualifying security, the
place of the client in the reorganization picture is his primary considera-
tion. The judicial assumption that only counsel representing aggregated
interests work for the benefit of the estate seems completely unfounded.
In fact, when counsel represents but a modest financial interest, he may
have a stronger incentive to think in terms of the entire estate because
of his effort to fortify his position and to make conspicuous his con-
tribution to the reorganization. In connection with all aspects of the re-
organization procedure other than fees, courts and counsel for large
committees have taken the attitude that reorganization is essentially a
bargain between owners, each guided by self-interest and each looking
out for himself.'M Yet with respect to fees, at least where independents
are concerned, counsel are expected to perform services for the benefit of
the estate rather than for their clients. If any distinction is to be drawn,
it is between services to the client which contribute nothing at all to the
reorganization of the property and services which contribute something.
It is this distinction that the Chandler Act suggests.
Public Policy, Post-Reorganization Control and Federal Incorporation
The interest of the public, suggestions of which permeate all of Chap-
ter Ten, is bluntly projected into Articles X and XI. The statutory concept
of public interest, first introduced in railroad reorganizations under Sec-
tion 77, has been changed to "public policy" and its generous, although
ambiguous, proportions have been outlined in Sections 216 and 221.
Before a reorganization is consummated, not only must the judge rule
that the identity, qualifications and affiliations of the management of
the reorganized company are consistent with public policy and the interests
of security holders, and not only must the plan contain provisions that
satisfy similar tests with respect to the manner of selecting directors,
officers or voting trustees, but the charter of the reorganized corporation
must include provisions prohibiting the issuance of non-voting stock,
protecting preferred stockholders in the event of dividend defaults, pre-
153. See In re Middle West Utilities Co., 17 F. Supp. 359, 370 (N. D. IMI. 1935) ;
Silver & Taylor v. Scullin Steel Co., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. U 51,331 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) ;
In re Varner-Quinlan Co., C. C. R. Bankr. Serv. ff4852 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); Birrell
v. Great Lakes Utilities Corp., C. C H. Bankr. Serv. Ul 5035 (C. C A. 3d, 1933). See
Dodd, swpra note 43, at 242-3.
154. Dodd, Reorganizatio; for Boakrtiptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935) 48 HAnv.
L. REv. 1100, 1107; Senate Hearings 33.
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scribing for the equitable distribution of voting power in the reorganized
company and, as to corporations with liabilities of $250,000 or over,
provisions requiring periodic reports to security holders. The compulsory
provisions to which a corporation must assent represent a mild measure
of federal control of the corporate structure after one, and before another,
reorganization. The vagueness and vagrancies of Section 216 require,
however, the enactment of an amendment or an implementing statute
which will clarify the references to "sound business and accounting prac-
tices" and particularize the generalities of "public policy." 15
The inflorescence of a public policy concept in Chapter Ten has the
additional merit of presenting an opportunity for ushering in federal
incorporation on a small, experimental scale. Federal incorporation itself
has 'a long history of scholarly discussion and Congressional inactivity,
the first borne of misgivings as to its constitutional validity and the other,
of misgivings as to its practical desirability. Without doing violence to
either its constitutional or practical apprehensions, Congress could create
a laboratory for studying the effects of federal incorporation by requiring
corporations to accept federal charters as a condition of their reorganiza-
tion under the federal acts. Insofar as the Borah-O'Mahoney1' 0 bill for
federal licensing embodies reforms of the corporate structure, its pro-
visions might serve as a pattern for a supplement to Chapter Ten. With-
out changing, but only filling in, the framework of Section 216, investors
and creditors could be protected by explicitly placing management under
fiduciary obligations, establishing qualifications for officers and directors,
outlawing opportunities for questionable directors' profits, ensuring effec-
tive publicity by frequent and complete reports, eliminating non-voting
securities and attending to the abuses which relaxed incorporation laws
have made it impossible for states to handle. The answers to many con-
stitutional and political problems would have to be formulated. Whether
charters should be imposed upon all corporations, in reliance upon the
bankruptcy power, or only upon those engaging in interstate commerce 15
whether imposition of a federal charter should obviate the necessity for
state charters ;1"s whether state charters should be permitted, but limiting
the free right to incorporate by requiring the reorganized corporation to
155. Heuston, mpra note 134, at 1213-1214, footnotes the ambiguities of "non-voting
stock," "rights in default." See Levi, Corporate Reorganization and a Minstr, of
Justice (1938) 23 Mnx. L. Rxv. 3, 19-22. For an application of § 216 see In re Thorp
Ice Cream Co., Inc., C. C. H. Bankr. Serv. 1 51,486 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
156. SYN. 3072, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
157. See Levi and Moore, Bankruptcy and Reorganization: A Survey of Changey
(1938). 5 U. oF CrI. L. REv. 1, 8, 398, 423.
158. See Morawetz, The Power of Congress to Enact Incorporation Laws anjd to
Regulate Corporations (1913) 26 HARV. L. REV. 667; Berlack, Federal Incorporation and
Securities Regulation (1936) 49 HARv. L. REv. 396.
[Vol. 48: 573
1939] REORGANIZATION REVISED 609
accept a charter from the state wherein it has its principal place of business
or its principal assets; 9 whether all reorganized corporations or only
those having liabilities of certain amount shall be subjected to the federal
charter requirements; what, if any, advantages should be bestowed on
federally chartered corporations to compensate for their being subjected
to more stringent corporate regulations than other corporations, must all
be considered. The proved ability of legislators to drift indefinitely
between competing orientations might make it desirable to define public
policy and sound business practice without awaiting the enactment of a
federal incorporation law for reorganized corporations. Some of the
benefits incidental to incorporation could thus be obtained before the
Congressional decision on more controversial issues of federal incor-
poration.
159. Perhaps this can be done under § 216 as it stands. Just as shopping around for
friendly jurisdictions within which to file reorianization petitions has been limited by
§ 128, so resort to "corporate Renos' may be limited by applying the theory of § 123
to the public policy concept of Chapter X.
